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Abstract: This paper estimates, using the most recent Irish Household Budget Survey of
2004/2005, a double hurdle model to determine the socio-economic and socio-demographic factors
affecting participation and expenditure of Irish households on the national lottery. Of particular
interest is the effect of income on the decisions of how much participants spend on the lottery. The
paper also determines the extent to which the tax inherent in lottery purchases is regressive in
its incidence on purchasers. It is found that gender, social class, marital status, the presence of
children in the home and household size significantly effect lottery participation. Lottery
expenditures are affected by income, location of the household, gender, age, education, social class
and whether the household has positive betting expenditures. Furthermore, there is evidence that
the implicit lottery tax is regressive and that the allocation of lottery proceeds does not
compensate for this regressivity.
I INTRODUCTION
This paper estimates a double hurdle model to determine the socio-economic and socio- demographic factors affecting lottery participation
and expenditure in Ireland. Further, it estimates the extent to which the
implicit lottery tax is regressive with respect to income. The Irish public
finance system has come under greater scrutiny in recent years due to the
dramatic deterioration in the fiscal balance. Nolan (2009) argues that the
current fiscal crisis may facilitate changes to the Irish tax system that make
it more efficient and more equitable. A neglected element of government
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financing in the current debate about public finances is receipts from the
National Lottery.
It has been argued that the lottery is different from other forms of
taxation, due to it being a voluntary decision for an individual to participate
in the lottery, and thus lotteries are perceived to be a less harmful means of
raising revenue for governments (Livernois, 1986). However, a proportion of
the price of every ticket is associated with raising revenues for ‘good causes’.
For example, 32 per cent of the cost of each lottery ticket sold in Ireland goes
directly to the Irish exchequer (National Lottery Annual Report, 2010). The
profit on the sale of lottery tickets is equivalent to an implicit tax.
Consequently, the lottery is no more a voluntary tax than that of Value Added
Tax (VAT) on goods and services and excise duty on tobacco goods and alcohol.
As is the case in all of these goods, the only way to avoid the tax is to not
purchase/consume the good (Livernois, 1986). 
Much of the concern about lotteries is that those who play are from lower
socio-economic backgrounds and participation is motivated by the hope of a
large win. Further, the expected return from buying a lottery ticket is negative
and therefore, lottery playing cannot be a feature of risk-aversion behaviour
and does not conform to conventional rational utility models in economics
(Purfield and Waldron, 2007). If individuals are not playing for entertainment
and if the true odds are misperceived, it could give rise to a social cost (Walker,
1998). Data limitations mean that this paper cannot explore these social costs
through the use of a behavioural model, and thus instead concentrates on the
regressivity of the implicit lottery tax. To do this the paper identifies the types
of individuals that play the lottery and whether it is a regressive method of
collecting taxes.
Researchers have modelled lottery expenditures and lottery tax incidence
in some detail in the United States (Sawkins and Dickie, 2002). Evidence from
the literature suggests that despite a wide demographic of lottery gamblers
taking part, the majority of players come from poorer, undereducated and
older groups (Clotfelter and Cook, 1987). Another issue in the literature on
lottery participation is that lottery expenditures may represent a regressive
tax, its incidence falling more heavily on individuals in lower socio-economic
groups (Abdel-Ghany and Sharpe, 2001). This paper explores whether this
regressivity is present in Ireland and analyses the implications of using the
Irish national lottery for tax revenue purposes.
This is the first Irish paper to examine the determinants of lottery
participation and expenditure and the incidence of the implicit lottery tax. A
double hurdle model of various socio-economic and socio-demographic
indicators is used to identify the determinants of Irish households’
participation in and expenditure on the lottery using data from the most
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recent Irish Household Budget Survey of 2004/2005. The purpose of the
double hurdle model is to determine whether the factors affecting
participation in the lottery are similar to those affecting the amount of
expenditure on the lottery. The extent to which the implicit lottery tax is
regressive is estimated using income elasticities and the Suits Index.
The Commission on Taxation (2009, p. 39) states “… a lack of progressivity
in one area of the [taxation] system may be compensated for by having a high
degree of progressivity in other areas, or by focused direct expenditure”. If the
lottery represents a regressive tax, its effects may be offset by expenditure of
lottery proceeds on areas most beneficial to poorer households. This paper
explores the extent to which regressivity in the implicit lottery tax is
compensated for in the allocation of lottery receipts by government. 
The next section contains a description of the Irish lottery system, in
particular addressing the motivation for having a lottery and the extent of
public revenue generated by lottery participation. A description of the data
and choice of variables for empirical analysis from the Irish Household Budget
Survey of 2004/2005 is provided in Section III. Section IV outlines the double
hurdle model on lottery expenditures and Section V reports the results. In
Section VI the regressivity of the implicit lottery tax is presented. The extent
to which the regressivity in the implicit lottery tax is compensated for in
lottery proceeds allocation is then considered in Section VII. The final section
summarises and presents conclusions. 
II THE IRISH LOTTERY
The Irish National Lottery has grown substantially in the number of
games available to play and consumer expenditure on it since its
establishment in 1986 and the first game in March 1987. Initially, the
National Lottery comprised of scratch card games but has since expanded to
include Lotto, Lotto 5-4-3-2-1, Lotto Plus, Millionaire Raffle, Monday Millions,
television bingo, televised game shows and participation in the international
Euromillions lottery (National Lottery Annual Report, 2008, p. 6). In 2010,
€430.6 million (56 per cent) of the National Lottery’s revenue came from Lotto
related games, €153.1 million (20 per cent) came from scratch cards, €131.7
million (17 per cent) came from Euromillions games and €56.4 million (7 per
cent) from other games. Operating costs were €108.4 million in 2010 (National
Lottery Annual Report, 2010, p. 55). All cash prizes in National Lottery games
are tax-free lump sums.
In 2010, National Lottery sales were €772 million. Winners were paid
€419.9 million and €243.7 million went to fund ‘good causes’. The cumulative
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amount of funding to good causes since 1987 is €3.6 billion (National Lottery
Annual Report, 2010, p. 11). Since its establishment, the Irish government
maintains the purpose of the lottery is to raise money for good causes. 
The National Lottery Act 1986 sets out the purposes of the National Lottery
funds. According to Section 5.1 money paid into the Central Fund shall be
applied for:
(a) “The purposes of such one or more of the following, and in such amounts,
as the Government may determine from time to time, that is to say, sport
and other recreation, national culture (including the Irish language), the
arts (within the meaning of the Arts Act, 1951) and the health of the
community.
(b) Such (if any) other purposes, and in such amounts, as the Government
may determine from time to time.”
This purpose was reinforced by Minister O’Keeffe in Dáil Éireann in 1986
where he stated “… the Government have decided that the surplus of the
lottery is to be applied to the benefit of sport and recreational facilities,
national culture, including the Irish language, the arts and health” (Dáil
Éireann, 1986). More recently the Chairman of the National Lottery said,
when referring to the amount raised by the lottery for good causes, that 
“… when you consider that this money has been allocated by the Government,
over the last 21 years, to worthwhile projects in the areas of Youth, Sports and
Amenities; Health and Welfare; Arts, Culture and National Heritage, and the
Irish Language, the ongoing positive impact of the National Lottery on local
communities throughout Ireland can really be appreciated” (National Lottery,
2008, p. 2).
The promotion of funding for good causes is important for the operators of
the lottery as it increases the social acceptability of this type of gambling and
means it generates little opposition and increased participation. 
III THE IRISH HOUSEHOLD BUDGET SURVEY 2004/2005
This paper uses data from the Household Budget Survey (HBS) of
2004/2005 (Central Statistics Office (CSO), 2006a). The 2004/2005 survey is
the most recent available. A random sample of 6,884 households participated,
representing a 47 per cent response rate (CSO, 2006a). The primary purpose
of the HBS is to determine the pattern of expenditure in Irish households to
update the weighting basis of the consumer price index. A detailed diary of
each household’s expenditure over a two-week period is collected. Respondents
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also provide data on variables such as income, facilities and socio-economic
characteristics. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper are reported in
Table 1. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. Lottery
expenditure is the dependent variable and the choice of explanatory variables
is based on a review of the literature, which identifies income, age, gender,
marital status, education, work status and occupation as the primary factors
affecting the demand for the lottery. The lottery expenditure and income
variable is adjusted using EU adult equivalence scales.1 Combined urban/
rural and regional discrete variables are included to identify any spatial
variations in the demand for the lottery. Household size is also included which
has been found to be a determinant of the demand for other consumer goods
(Newman, Henchion and Matthews, 2001 and 2003; Keelan, Newman and
Henchion, 2005). A household betting indicator is also employed in the study.
This is a variable that is new to the literature. It is expected that households
that spend more money on betting also tend to spend money on the lotto,
relative to a household that does not spend money on betting. Head of
household is divided into five separate age categories ranging from 15 years to
65 years plus. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Continuous Variables: Mean St. Dev.
Lottery Expenditures 3.21 5.94
Lottery Expenditures > 0 (n = 3,082 , % of sample = 44.77 ) 7.16 7.10
Number of Persons 2.95 1.59
Income (Proxied by total household expenditure) 851.45 602.36
Binary Variables: Percentage of 
Households
Location:
Rural – Dublin, South & East 18.23
Rural – Border, Midland & West 15.94
Urban – Dublin Metropolitan Area 22.02
Urban – Dublin, all other urban areas 5.29
Urban – South & East > 20,000 population 7.95
Urban – South & East 3,000-20,000 population 12.22
Urban – South & East < 3,000 population 5.00
Urban – BMW > 20,000 population 1.95
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (contd.)
Binary Variables: Percentage of 
Households
Urban – BMW 3,000-20,000 population 7.26
Urban – BMW < 3,000 population 4.14
Sex of HO a
Male 59.89
Female 40.11
Age of HOH:
Age HOH 15-34 Years 16.69
Age HOH 35-44 Years 24.11
Age HOH 45-54 Years 21.78
Age HOH 55-64 Years 16.44
Age HOH 65 Plus Years 20.98
Education of HOH:
No education or Primary education 22.33
Secondary educationb 49.58
Third Level education 28.09
Work Status of HOH:c
Employed full 51.77
Employed part 9.78
Unemployed 2.69
Not available for work 35.76
Social group of HOH:
Employers, Managers and Professional 29.42
Nonmanual 16.23
Manual skilled and semiskilled 19.02
Unskilled and Other Agricultural workers 6.61
Own Account and Farmers 15.43
Other 13.31
Marital Status:
Single 51.12
Married 48.88
Children (<18) in the Household:
Children 43.33
No Children 56.67
Betting:
Household has positive betting expenditures 23.65
Household has zero betting expenditures 76.35
a HOH = Head of household.
b Includes HOH’s still in education. The assumption would be that these HOH’s have
at least attained secondary education.
c ‘Employed’ categories include full-time and part-time workers who are employed, self-
employed and in community employment schemes. ‘Unemployed’ category includes
those seeking work or those out of work due to illness or those not yet at work. ‘Not
available for work’ category includes those who are engaged in home duties, retired,
still in education, have a permanent incapacity to work or others.
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As with all data sets, there are some shortcomings in the HBS. The
reliability of the information received from participants is crucial. There is the
difficulty of collecting consistent estimates on income data and alcoholic drink
and tobacco expenditure (Central Statistics Office, 2006a). There may be
similar effects on reported spending on gambling as participants may be
reluctant to give information on those aspects. However, despite these
shortcomings, the HBS is the best available source of information on the
income, expenditure and socio-economic characteristics of Irish households.
In this study, the data is cross-sectional and price is therefore, assumed
constant as the HBS does not record price. Also, since there are several
different lottery games which individuals may play and these are all priced
differently, it is not possible to control for price in the estimations. 
IV DOUBLE HURDLE MODEL OF LOTTERY EXPENDITURES
The presence of zero expenditure in the dependent variable, such as that
generated by household expenditure surveys, poses difficulties when
analysing micro-data. Excluding these zero observations and running an OLS
regression on the positive expenditure creates biased results of the parameter
estimates. This would be especially the case when the dependent variable is
zero for a substantial proportion of the population.
There are three reasons identified for zero observations (Newman et al,
2001): corner solutions, non-consumption or purchase infrequency. Corner
solutions specify that a household chooses not to purchase a product at
existing prices and income. Non-consumption occurs if a household chooses not
to purchase a product due to reasons that are independent of prices and
income. Purchase infrequency normally applies to durable goods whose
purchasing cycle may be longer than the survey period.
The Tobit Model was the original model developed to analyse the problem
of censored dependent variables and has been used in analysing lottery
expenditures by Livernois (1986), and Clotfelter and Cook (1987). The model
overcomes the problem of censored regressions by attributing the censoring to
a standard corner solution. Thus households that do not make lottery
purchases do so because they are restrained by relative prices and their
income. This may be a restrictive assumption as zeros may come from the
individual’s deliberate choice to abstain from consuming the good. For
example, individuals may not make lottery purchases because they do not
believe they have any chance of winning. A further limitation of the Tobit
model is that it assumes the same variables affect the probability of a non-zero
observation (the participation decision) as well as the level of a positive
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observation (the consumption decision) and moreover with the same sign. It
may be more reasonable to allow the size and nature of the factors that affect
the two decisions to be different. Ignoring this facet of the decision process
creates difficulties in understanding the true behavioural patterns of
consumer purchasing, potentially resulting in incorrect conclusions (Haines,
Guilkey and Popkin, 1988, p. 543).
As a result of these shortcomings, a number of generalisations to the Tobit
model have been developed. One generalisation which is popular in the
literature is the double hurdle model, originally formulated by Cragg (1971).
The model postulates that individuals must pass two separate hurdles before
they are observed with a positive level of consumption. The first hurdle
corresponds to factors affecting participation in the market for the good and
the second to the level of consumption of the good. A different latent variable
is used to model each decision process, with a probit determining the
participation process and a tobit determining the expenditure level. The
double hurdle model can be specified as follows (Blundell and Meghir, 1987,
Newman et al., 2003),
y*i1 = wiα + ui Participation Decision
y*i2 = xiβ + νi Expenditure Decision
yi = xiβ + νi if y*i1 > 0 and y*i2 > 0
yi = 0 otherwise
where y*i1 is a latent endogenous variable representing an individual or
household’s participation decision, y*i2 is a latent endogenous variable repre -
sent ing an individual or household’s consumption decision, yi is the observed
dependent variable (lottery expenditures), wi is a set of individual character -
istics explaining the participation decision, xi is variables explaining the
expenditure decision and ui and vi are independent, homoscedastic, normally
distributed error terms.
The double hurdle model is estimated using maximum likelihood
techniques with the log likelihood given as follows:
xiβ 1      yi – xiβLL =  ln 1 – Φ(wiα)Φ––– +  ln Φ(wiα) –– φ ––––––
0 σi + σi σi
where φ and Φ are the probability density functions and cumulative
distribution function for a standard normal random variable respectively. The
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model can be modified2 to allow for heteroscedasticity by specifying the
variance of the errors as a function of a set of continuous variables (Newman
et al., 2003 and Aristei and Pieroni, 2008) as follows:
σi = exp (zih)
where zi represents the continuous variables in xi, the set of variables
explaining the expenditure decision. The exponential specification is chosen as
it imposes the desirable property that the standard deviation σi be strictly
positive (Yen and Su, 1995).
To assess the impact of the regressors on the dependent variable, marginal
effects can be calculated using the maximum likelihood results obtained from
the double hurdle model. Three different marginal effects can be calculated
based on three different definitions of the expected value of the dependent
variable yi. Of most interest is the overall effect on the dependent variable,
that is, the expected value of yi for values of the explanatory variables, x. In
the Tobit model and its various generalisations, this is more commonly known
as the unconditional expectation (or unconditional mean) of yi and is written
as E[yi  x]. The unconditional expectation can be decomposed into two parts,
the conditional expectation, E[yi  x, yi > 0] which is the expected value of yi for
values of the explanatory variables, x, conditional of yi > 0 and the probability
of a positive value of yi for values of the explanatory variables, x, P[yi > 0  x]. 
The decomposition of the unconditional expectation into the probability of
participation and the conditional expectation is based on the work by
McDonald and Moffitt (1980) in their decomposition of the unconditional mean
of the dependent variable in the Tobit model and can be summarised by the
following equation:
E[yi  x] = P[yi > 0  x]* E[yi  x, yi > 0]
In the double hurdle model the probability of participation and the level of
expenditure conditional on participation are (Yen and Su, 1995, Mutlu and
Garcia, 2006):
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produced plausible results. The IHS heteroscedastic Double Hurdle model returned a highly
insignificant IHS parameter and in addition, the Wald chi-statistic for the model was also highly
insignificant. Convergence of the log likelihood for the Box Cox heteroscedastic DH model could
not be achieved despite several attempts at introducing exclusion restrictions to identify the
parameters of the model.
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xiβP[yi > 0  x] = Φ(wiα)Φ –––σi
E[yi  yi > 0, x] = xiβ + σi ––––––
Marginal effects can be calculated by differentiating each of the above
equations with respect to each explanatory variable.3 For the continuous
explanatory variables such as income, these marginal effects can be used to
calculate elasticities at the sample means.
The majority of applications of the double hurdle model have been in
household expenditure modelling. The model is particularly popular for
analysing tobacco and alcohol household expenditures, mainly due to
Atkinson, Gomulka and Stern (1984) and Jones (1989).4 The double hurdle
model has also been applied to analyse household food expenditures including
meat expenditures and expenditure on prepared meals for Irish households
(Newman et al., 2001 and 2003), food expenditure away from the home for
Spanish households (Mutlu and Garcia, 2006) and US household consumption
of cheese (Yen and Jones, 1997). A non-food and non-drink application has
been Carroll, McCarthy and Newman (2005) who studied the determinants of
charitable donations by Irish households. Abdel-Ghany and Sharpe (2001) and
Humphreys, Lee and Soebbing (2010) appear to be the only two articles which
use the double hurdle model to analyse lottery expenditures, both using
Canadian household survey data. Stranahan and Borg (1998) and Sawkins
and Dickie (2002) use two part models incorporating a probit and truncated
tobit in the two stages while Farrell and Walker (1999) and Scott and Garen
(1994) use Heckman’s sample selectivity models in their analysis of lottery
expenditures. The application of the double hurdle model to Irish lottery
expenditures in this paper thus represents a significant addition to the
existing literature in the area. 
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3 Details of the derivations of the marginal effects can be obtained from the first author.
4 Other studies on tobacco and alcohol household expenditures include Yen (2005), Jones (1992),
Garcia and Labeaga (1996) and Aristei and Pieroni (2008) on US, UK, Spanish and Italian
household tobacco expenditures respectively and Blaylock and Blisard (1993) and Yen and Jensen
(1996) on US household alcohol expenditures.
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V PARTICIPATION AND EXPENDITURE ON THE IRISH LOTTERY
The maximum likelihood estimates of the heteroscedastic double hurdle5
model for lottery participation and expenditure are presented in Table 2. The
participation hurdle estimates the factors that influence the decision of
households to take part in the lottery. The expenditure hurdle estimates the
factors influencing the amount a household spends on the lottery.
Table 2: Heteroscedastic Double Hurdle Maximum Likelihood Estimates –
Lottery Expenditures
Participation Expenditure Hetero-
scedastic
Explanatory Variables (Continuous):
Number of Persons 0.724*** –0.066*** –0.216***
Income 0.007*** 0.000***
Income squared –0.000***
Explanatory Variables (Binary):
Location:
Rural – Dublin, South and East (ref)
Rural – Border, Midland and West –0.266 0.202
Urban – Dublin Metropolitan Area 0.245 0.542***
Urban – Dublin, all other urban areas 0.164 0.640**
Urban – South and East >20,000 population 0.397 0.052
Urban – South and East 3,000-20,000 population 0.397 0.324
Urban – South and East <3,000 population 0.482 0.192
Urban – BMW >20,000 population –0.457 0.282
Urban – BMW 3,000-20,000 population –0.165 0.035
Urban – BMW <3,000 population 0.502 0.599*
Sex of HOH:
Male (ref)
Female 0.503** –0.283*
Age of HOH:
Age HOH 15-34 Years –0.529 –0.474**
Age HOH 35-44 (ref) Years
Age HOH 45-54 Years –0.051 0.418**
Age HOH 55-64 Years 0.157 0.842**
Age HOH 65 plus Years –0.184 0.636*
Education of HOH:
No education or Primary education (ref)
Secondary education 0.228 –0.092
Third Level education –0.298 –1.078***
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Table 2: Heteroscedastic Double Hurdle Maximum Likelihood Estimates –
Lottery Expenditures (contd.)
Participation Expenditure Hetero-
scedastic
Work Status of HOH:
Employed full (ref)
Employed part 0.575 –0.094
Unemployed –0.638 0.361
Not available for work –0.397 0.066
Social group of HOH:
Employers, Managers and Professional –0.072 –1.023***
Nonmanual –0.162 –0.426**
Manual skilled and semiskilled (ref)
Unskilled and Other Agricultural workers –0.779** 0.074
Own Account and Farmers –0.860*** –1.190***
Other –0.527* –1.184***
Marital Status:
Single –0.498* –0.095
Married (ref)
Children (<18) in the Household:
Children –1.001** –0.094
No Children (ref)
Betting:
Household has positive betting expenditures 5.359 1.615***
Household has zero betting expenditures (ref)
*** p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value <0.10
The results indicate that the age of the head of household (HOH) has a
significant effect on lottery expenditures with younger HOH spending less and
older HOH spending more with reference to the age category of 35-44 years.
This result differs to that of Clotfelter and Cook (1991) who find lottery
participation by age takes an inverted-U shape; those aged 18 to 25 and 65 and
older play less than the middle-aged. However, Abdel-Ghany and Sharpe
(2001) find that lottery expenditure in many provinces of Canada increases
with the age of players. Turning to educational effects, we find that HOH’s
with a third level education spend significantly less money on the lottery than
those HOH’s who have a primary education or less. This finding is consistent
with the literature. Clotfelter and Cook (1987), Abdel-Ghany and Sharpe
(2001) and Hansen (1995) also indicate that lottery play declines at higher
levels of formal education attainment.
In this paper, social class variables are used to proxy for occupational
status. The results indicate that HOH’s in higher social classifications
(employers, managers, professional and non-manual professions) spend less
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on the lottery than HOH’s in lower social classification (manual skilled and
semi-skilled professions). The finding here is consistent with Clotfelter and
Cook (1991) who find advanced professionals play the lottery the least and
skilled and unskilled labourers play the most. Own account workers (self-
employed) and farmers also spend less on the lottery than HOH’s in manual
skilled and semi-skilled professions. We also include dummy variables on the
work status of the HOH on the basis that the scale of a lottery prize may be
worth more to unemployed people that those in employment. However none of
these variables were significant in either the participation or expenditure
equations. Perez and Humphreys (2011) use an employed indicator and also
did not find a significant relationship between employment status and lottery
expenditure. Further research, perhaps incorporating a behavioural model,
may be worthwhile to shed further light on this effect.
A single HOH is less likely to participate in lottery spending, a result
which is consistent with findings from Perez and Humphreys (2011). A
household that has children is also less likely to participate in lottery spending
than a household without children, a finding which is not surprising as
families with children tend to divert expenditures toward necessity items
rather than luxuries. Female HOH’s are less likely to participate in lotto
purchases, relative to male HOH’s, but once they participate they spend more
relative to male HOH’s. Household size has a significantly positive effect on
lottery participation but has no effect on lottery expenditures. This suggests
that larger households have a higher probability of spending on the lottery but
do not spend significantly more or less than smaller households. A household
living in an urban area of the Dublin region spends more on the lottery,
relative to a household living in a rural area in Dublin, the South or the East
of Ireland. The significance of urban regions (and primarily those located in
Dublin) is contrary to findings from Abdel-Ghany and Sharpe (2001) where, in
two regions in Canada, rural households spent significantly more on the
lottery than urban households. The significant urban result in this study may
suggest that convenience to shops provides greater opportunities for people to
spend on the lottery. The hypothesis that lottery and betting expenditures are
complementary to one another is supported by the finding that households
that spend money on betting tend to spend more on the lottery than
households that do not make betting expenditures. 
Finally, the income variable in the expenditure part of the model is
significant and positive. The income squared variable is also significant but
negative suggesting a non-linear relationship between lottery expenditures
and total household expenditures. The size of the income elasticity and the
non-linear relationship between income and lottery expenditure sheds light on
the regressivity of the implicit lottery tax, which is discussed in more detail in
the next section.
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VI REGRESSIVITY OF IMPLICIT LOTTERY TAX
The extent to which the implicit lottery tax is regressive can be estimated
by examining income elasticity of lottery expenditure. Clotfelter and Cook say
“… tax is called regressive if, as a percentage of income, it falls as income
increases, and a progressive tax is one that increases as a percentage of
income as one moves up the income scale” (1991, p. 223). Table 3 shows the
estimated income elasticities for the probability of participation, the
conditional expectation and the unconditional expectation. The unconditional,
or total, elasticity of income on the dependent variable is 0.4. This finding
implies regressivity in the implicit lottery tax. 
Table 3: Estimated Income Elasticities
Prob Cond Uncond
0.169*** 0.231*** 0.401***
Note: Elasticities are calculated including the income squared term.
‘Prob’ refers to effect on the probability of participation. 
‘Cond’ refers to the effect on the level of expenditure conditional on participation. 
‘Uncond’ refers to the unconditional effect on the level of expenditure, i.e. the total
effect. 
*** p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value <0.10
This result is consistent with the general findings in the literature. Abdel-
Ghany and Sharpe (2001), in a survey of the literature, indicate that the
majority of studies find households in lower income categories spend a greater
fraction of their income on lotteries. Clotfelter and Cook (1991) identify a
similar pattern in the American literature. Furthermore, Livernois (1986)
calculates an income elasticity of 0.72, which, though significantly higher than
that estimated in this paper, also indicates implicit lottery tax regressivity.
However, Perez and Humphreys (2011) find a strong relationship between
lottery expenditures and income, with estimated income elasticities greater
than one.
The degree of progressivity of taxes may also be estimated using a Suits
Index (Suits, 1977). The Suits Index allows the progressivity of taxes to be
compared with other types of taxes across countries. It is calculated in a
similar way to a Gini Ratio and Lorenz Curve. The Suits Index is calculated
as 1- (R/S) where R is the area below the Lorenz Curve and S is the area below
the 45-degree line. 
Like the Gini Ratio, the Suits Index varies from –1 to +1, where –1
indicates perfect regressivity and +1 indicates perfect progressivity. In the
212 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
01 Crowley article_ESRI Vol 43-2  27/06/2012  14:12  Page 212
Suits Index the cumulative percentage of the tax burden is plotted against the
cumulative percentage of income. Where the Lorenz Curve lies on the 45-
degree line the tax is neither progressive nor regressive. In this case the lower
50 per cent of the population in terms of income pay exactly 50 per cent of total
tax. If the Lorenz Curve lies above the 45-degree line a tax is regressive. The
further the Lorenz Curve is above the 45-degree line, the more regressive is
the tax. The opposite is the case if the Lorenz Curve lies below the 45-degree
line, indicating that the tax is progressive.
The Suits Index has been used to estimate the progressivity of several
types of tax. Nolan, Maître, O’Neill and Sweetman (2000) estimate a Suits
Index value of 0.282 for income tax and 0.147 for PRSI contributions in
Ireland for the tax year 1994/1995. Suits (1977) estimates an index of 0.19,
0.32 and 0.18 for income tax, corporate tax and property tax respectively in the
US Suits (1977) also calculates index values for sales and excise taxes and
payroll taxes of –0.15 and –0.13 respectively, suggesting these two taxes are
regressive. 
It was noted in the data description section that the accuracy and
reliability of income data in the household budget survey is uncertain. As a
result, total expenditure was used in the previous regression analysis. For
ease of comparison, a Suits Index is calculated for two different income
variables; total expenditure and disposable income, and these are shown in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Suits Index of Progressivity for Implicit Lottery Tax
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Irrespective of the income indicator used, the implicit lottery tax is found
to be regressive.6 The Suits Index value using disposable income is –0.27 and
the index value using total expenditure is –0.24.7 This is consistent with
measures of regressivity in other lottery studies. For example, Suits (1977)
estimates an index value of –0.31 for State Lotteries, Clotfelter (1979)
estimates an index value of –0.24 for the Maryland lottery, Livernois (1986)
calculates an index value of –0.10 for Canadian lotteries and Beckert and
Lutter (2009) estimates an index of –0.23 for German lotteries. However,
comparisons of the Suits Index between studies needs to be interpreted with
caution as the index calculations are influenced by how the data is originally
scaled, which differs from study to study in the literature. 
VII COMPENSATING FOR REGRESSIVITY IN THE IMPLICIT 
LOTTERY TAX
These findings have implications for the equity of the National Lottery,
particularly since the Irish government uses revenue from lottery
participation to fund projects in the areas of Health and Welfare, Sports,
Culture and the Arts, which may otherwise have been funded from central
exchequer funds.
The regressivity characterising the implicit lottery tax may be
compensated for in the allocation of lottery receipts. This compensation would
take the form of disbursement of lottery funds to ‘good causes’ which favour
those on lower incomes. Since lottery grants are provided to organisations
rather than households it is not possible to fully identify whether lower income
households receive greater shares. However, there is significant evidence to
question whether the allocation of lottery funds compensates for the
regressivity of the implicit lottery tax. 
Table 4 presents the allocation of national lottery funding for 2004 and
2005, which corresponds to the Household Budget Survey used in this paper.
It shows that the majority of funding from the National Lottery was allocated
to Arts, Sports and Tourism. Of this, 84 per cent in 2004 and 58 per cent in
2005 was allocated to sports capital grants and the Irish Sports Council. There
is strong evidence that the allocation of sports grants from National Lottery
funding was determined by political considerations rather than an intention
to compensate for regressivity. 
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6 For the Suits analysis, the total expenditure and the disposable income measures are adjusted
using equivalence scales. The chosen income category levels were guided by the equivalised
income deciles used in the 2005 EU survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) in Ireland
(Central Statistics Office, 2006b).
7 For more information on the Suits Index calculation see Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix.
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Considine, Crowley, Foley and O’Connor (2008) analyse the allocation of
Irish National Lottery Sports Capital Grants between 1999 and 2007 and find
a clear bias towards the geographical areas represented by the Minister for
Arts, Sports and Tourism and the Minister for Finance. They state “the money
follows the ministers” (2008, p. 43). Considine, Coffey and Kiely (2004) find
that the county that elects the Minister with responsibility for allocating
National Lottery grants receives the highest per capita funding from the
National Lottery. Given political influence on lottery funds dispersal there is
no reason to expect poorer households accrue a greater proportion of the
benefits of that dispersal.
The sizeable proportion of lottery funding that is allocated to sport is also
notable in terms of compensating for the regressivity of the implicit lottery
tax. Fahey, Layte and Gannon (2004) in a study of sports participation in
Ireland find higher socio-economic groups had higher levels of participation.
This suggests that, while lower socio-economic groups spend a higher
proportion of income on the lottery, at least a large portion of the lottery
funding goes to activities in which they are less likely to participate. It is also
unlikely that the provision of sporting facilities as part of the capital
programme funded by the National Lottery is addressing lower participation
among lower socio-economic groups, as Lunn and Layte (2011, p. 59) argue
that increasing participation will come “… not from providing more sporting
facilities, but from organising and marketing sporting opportunities that use
existing facilities and are convenient and easy to take”. Lunn (2007) in a study
of sports participation using data from 3,000 Irish adults finds that those with
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Table 4: Allocation of National Lottery Funding 2004 and 2005
2004 2005
Percentage Percentage
€000 of Total €000 of Total 
Office of the Minister for Finance 7,618 3 7,730 2
Environment, Heritage and Local Government 20,768 9 23,175 7
Education and Skills 30,915 13 36,190 11
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs 32,705 14 87,748 27
Arts, Sports and Tourism 130,212 55 157,440 48
Defence 693 0 1,123 0
Health and Children 3,536 1 3,722 1
Health Service Executive 9,481 4 9,557 3
237,932 328,690
Source: Department of Finance (2005 and 2006). 
Note: In 2005 total expenditure was part-funded by €210.5 million from the National
Lottery. A breakdown of lottery-only financing is not available. The 2004 expenditure
was fully funded from the National Lottery.
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low incomes or low education levels are much less likely to participate in sport.
He states “… public spending on sport is very likely to be regressive with the
less well-off subsidising the activities of the better off” (2007, p. vii).
It is also a stylised fact from international literature on arts participation
that there is a positive relationship between participation, including
attendance at art events, and income (Ateca-Amestoy, 2008). There is some
evidence of a similar relationship in Ireland. The Arts Council (2006:70) notes
that “… people on lower incomes take part to a much lesser extent in cultural
activities that are the norm for those on higher income levels”. This is further
evidence that lottery funding is not focused on areas benefiting lower socio-
economic groups which spend more on lottery tickets.
While not related to the issue of compensating for regressivity, it is also
notable in the context of this paper’s findings that the second highest category
for National Lottery funding is Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs. The
analysis of determinants of lottery participation and expenditure presented in
Section V indicates that households in urban locations (primarily Dublin
areas) are more likely to participate in and spend more on the lottery. The
sizeable portion of lottery grants allocated to rural and Gaeltacht projects
suggest there is a redistribution of income within the lottery from urban areas
to rural areas. This implies that there is not a mechanism within the lottery
proceeds allocation models to ensure those who spend on the lottery are
favoured in the allocation of lottery funding, and this may also apply in
relation to socio-economic category.
Finally, it is also notable that, though lottery play declines at higher levels
of formal education attainment, the third highest category of funding from
lottery proceeds in 2004 and 2005 was education and skills. If this funding is
directed at addressing educational disadvantage among lower socio-economic
groups there will be compensation for the regressivity in the implicit lottery
tax. However, since the allocation of lottery funds, including in the area of
education and skills, is at the discretion of the responsible Minister it may be
expected that political influences will be as strong as a desire to compensate
for regressivity. Since the evidence suggests that political patronage may be
the primary motivation for lottery funds allocation it would seem that where
lower income households benefit, this may be coincidental rather than
designed.
VIII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper, using a double-hurdle model of lottery participation and
expenditure, finds that income, age, gender, education, social class, household
size, urban location and positive betting expenditures are significant
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variables. These findings are generally consistent with the international
literature that explores the characteristics of lottery players. The paper goes
on to test for the regressivity of the implied lottery tax, estimating both income
elasticity and a Suits Index. Both measures demonstrate that lottery
expenditure is regressive, indicating that poorer households spend larger
proportions of their income on the lottery.
The paper explores the extent to which the regressivity in the implicit
lottery tax is compensated for through the allocation of lottery proceeds.
Evidence is presented that casts doubt on the use of lottery proceeds to favour
lower socio-economic households. Greater transparency in the allocation of
lottery funds to ‘good causes’ would enable a more precise analysis of the
extent to which lower socio-economic households may or may not benefit from
their greater proportionate spending on the lottery. The paper is further
evidence of the need to remove political influence on lottery funds dispersal
and the adoption of an explicit objective of supporting projects that benefit
poorer households to a greater extent. For example, the introduction of a
scheme similar to that used in the UK described by Bailey and Connolly (1997)
where distribution boards are responsible for each good cause, may reduce
political influence on fund distribution elements of the lottery.
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Table A2: Likelihood Ratio Test, Double Hurdle Versus Heteroscedastic
Double Hurdle Model 
Restricted (H0): 
Double Hurdle Log-likelihood –11,542.32
Unrestricted (H1): 
Hetero Double Hurdle Log-likelihood –11,243.16
Test statistic:
(2*(Unrestricted-Restricted)) 598.33
Critical value 1% (chi-squared with df = number of variables in
heteroscedasticity equation) 6.63
P-value 0.000
Result Reject H0
Table A3: Cumulative Percentages of Implicit Lottery Tax Paid and
Cumulative Percentage Income by Income Category (Total Household
Expenditure as a Proxy for Income)
Weekly Income Cumulative % Cumulative %
Lottery Taxes Income 
€0–€163.99 6.96 2.48 
€164–€204.99 15.19 6.45 
€205–€252.99 24.65 12.47 
€253–€313.99 39.05 22.48 
€314–€375.99 52.27 34.43 
€376–€458.99 66.08 48.18 
€459–€540.99 76.92 61.48 
€541–€652.99 85.63 74.60 
€653–€870.99 94.21 88.12 
€871> 100.00 100.00 
Source: Irish Household Budget Survey 2004/2005.
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Table A4: Cumulative Percentages of Implicit Lottery Tax Paid and
Cumulative Percentage Income by Income Category (Disposable Income as a
Proxy for Income)
Weekly Income Cumulative % Cumulative %
Lottery Taxes Income 
€0–€163.99 6.37 2.48 
€164–€204.99 20.02 8.22 
€205–€252.99 29.70 14.33 
€253–€313.99 40.64 23.04 
€314–€375.99 52.20 33.67 
€376–€458.99 66.52 48.10 
€459–€540.99 78.10 60.40 
€541–€652.99 86.25 72.46 
€653–€870.99 94.94 87.35 
€871> 100.00 100.00
Source: Irish Household Budget Survey 2004/2005.
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